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I. Introduction
A seventy-two- year-old woman in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma is willing to 
cut prescription pills in half or not take them at all, in order to stretch her dollar and 
prolong the amount of time she can spend with these precious little commodities.1  If 
dissection of pills does not prolong her supply sufficiently, she is willing to travel to a 
foreign country to buy cheaper pills.2 Another elderly person reflected on her choice to 
access the legal goods in a potentially illegal way by stating: “Life is sure more 
comfortable if you don’t hurt so bad.”3  Pharmaceuticals are not only a desired good on 
an open market, but they are vital for the very survival of many individuals in the United 
States.  However, the pharmaceutical companies’ level of profit and success is directly 
correlated with the physical suffering and economic hardship experienced by most 
Americans who depend on pharmaceuticals for survival.
In 2002, nearly 15% of the Gross Domestic Product in the United States was 
spent on health care, which translates to approximately $5,440 for every citizen. 4  In fact, 
the Journal of Health Affairs reported that spending on health care in 2002 grew more 
than any other industry in the United States.5  Congress has stated: “[d]espite increases in 
medical care spending that are greater than the rate of inflation, population growth, and 
Gross Domestic Product growth, there has not been a commensurate improvement in our 
health status as a nation.”6
As a subspecies of the health care industry, pharmaceutical companies enjoy the 
largest profit margin of any industry in the United States.7  The pharmaceutical industry 
has finally been able to surface from the quagmire of market restraint in order to meet 
society’s insatiable appetite for health.  Or is the pharmaceutical industries’ experience in 
the United States an anomaly?
1
 Brian Barber, RxDepot Hearing Ends, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 10, 2003, at A1.
2 Id.
3
 Id.
4
 Sara Schaefer Munoz, U.S. Health Care Spending Rose 9.3%  in 2002, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2004, at A2.
5 Id.
6
 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1014, 
42 U.S.C. § 299(a)(3) (2003) [hereinafter Act of 2003].
7
 Shawna Lydon Woodward, Note, Will Price Control Legislation Satisfactorily Address the Issue of High 
Prescription Drug Prices?: Several States Are Waiting in the Balance for PhRMA v. Concannon, 26 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 169, 174-175 (2002).
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Despite the pharmaceutical companies’ profiteering triumph in the United States, 
the triumph is not necessarily representative of pharmaceutical companies’ success the 
world round.8 Arguably, the pharmaceutical companies do not operate under the harness 
of typical market restraints.9 Distinguishing the United States further from the rest of the 
worlds, the brunt of the significant profit margin enjoyed by the pharmaceutical industry 
is borne directly by the consumer and not the government.10  These costs are paid in the 
form of increased premiums for insurance and private pharmaceutical drug plans, or 
through increased tax monies that fund social legislation designed to provide prescription 
drug coverage for various impoverished sectors of American society.  In 2003, employer 
sponsored health care plans rose in cost an average of 10% per employee, forcing 
employers to pass the increased costs onto their employees.  Meanwhile, 19% fewer 
employers provide health care coverage to senior citizen retirees than just ten years ago.11
The search to find mechanisms to reduce the cost of pharmaceutical drugs is 
reaching a head, if the debate has not done so already.  Various state legislatures have 
enacted mandatory rebate and prior authorization measures to deter physicians from 
prescribing high priced brand name pharmaceuticals to Medicaid recipients without a 
medically necessary reason as to why a cheaper generic solution could not be 
implemented.12 For example, the state of Maine has not only threatened disclosure of the 
names of companies who refuse to participate in the program, but Maine has also 
increased the number of beneficiaries under the Maine Prescription statute to include a 
non-Medicare, non-Medicaid population of under or uninsured.13  The beneficiaries under 
Maine’s prescription drug plan now includes a suffering group of individuals whose 
personal insurance or pharmaceutical drug plans fail to adequately cover their 
8
 Woodward, supra note 7, at 174.  Although the pharmaceutical industry is one of the most profitable in 
the world, Americans pay more for their drugs than any other country in the world. Id.  
9
 Michael B. Moore, “Open Wide” (Your Pocketbook That Is!)- A Call For the Establishment in the United 
States of a Prescription Drug Price Regulatory Agency, 1 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 149, 154-155 (Fall 
1994).
10 See, e.g., Act of 2003, supra note 3. 
11
 Vaness Fuhrmans, Shifting Burden Helps Employers Cut Health Costs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B1.
12
 Martha Ann Holt, International Prescription Drug Cost Containment Strategies and Suggestions For 
Reform in the United States, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 325, 340-42 (Spring 2003).  Those state 
legislatures include: Maine, Wisconsin, and Michigan.  See generally PhRMA v. Walsh, 123 S.Ct. 1855 
(2003)(discussing Maine legislation); PhRMA v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2002)(discussing 
Florida legislation). 
13
 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681 (2002). As compared to other states with similar statutes.  See, e.g. Marth Ann Holt, 
supra note 12, at 340-42.
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prescription expenses and who do not qualify as traditional Medicaid recipients.14  The 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Maine Prescription statute, holding that 
the program did not place a disparate burden on interstate commerce and vacated a 
preliminary injunction barring the implementation of the state’s statute.15
Likewise, frustrated by the lack of effective regulation of pharmaceutical prices in 
the U.S., individuals struggling to make ends meet have traveled, both physically and 
electronically, to foreign markets for relief.16  One of the more popular of the foreign 
markets is Canada.17 Within many states, officials on both the local and state 
governmental levels have, not only provided incentives for state and local employees to 
purchase drugs from Canadian pharmacies instead of American pharmacies,18 but have 
also set up websites for the benefit of all citizens of a given state.19 Although the private 
industry has attempted to facilitate international access to those who cannot physically 
travel, private industry facilitation of international access to pharmaceuticals has met 
some level of defeat.20  The United States Congress has circumnavigated the individual 
states’ ability to regulate the public welfare of their citizens by granting sole legislative 
discretion on the issue to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; a member of the 
executive branch.21
Parts II, III, and IV of this article examine the arguments surrounding possible 
free market price control mechanisms, in light of the pharmaceutical importation cases 
14
 See 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681, supra note 13. “ ‘Qualified resident’ also means a resident of the State whose 
family incurs unreimbursed expenses for prescription drugs that equal 5% or more of family income or 
whose total unreimbursed medical expenses equal 15% or more of family income.”
15Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1873 (2003).
16
 Anne Wilde Mathews, States to Help Citizens Import Canadian Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2003, at 
B1. 
17 Id. 
18 Boston to Force Issue on Canadian Drugs, WALL ST. J., December 10, 2003, page unavailable.
19
 Mathews, supra note 16, at B1.
20
 United States v. RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1247 (2003).  But see 21 U.S.C § 384 (2003) (allowing 
Secretary of Health and Human Services the capacity to approve re-importers of pharmaceuticals).  See 
also FDA Warns CanaRx Services About Its Illegal Internet Website & Mail Operation Obtaining 
Unapproved & Potentially Risky Drugs From Canada, 13 BIOMEDICAL MKT. NEWSL. 14, Oct. 31, 2003 
[hereinafter FDA Warns].  
21
 Act of 2003, supra note 3. In fact, Congress wishes to grant the ability of the Secretary to “provide 
legally binding advisory opinions on appropriate interpretation and application of regulations to carry out 
the medicare program…”; which would allow the executive the exclusive ability to decide on behalf of the 
aging American people what is in their best interest in procuring and accessing not only pharmaceutical 
drugs, but also the extent of health care coverage Medicare would practically have. Id. See also 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1395hh NOTE (2003).  
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and state Medicaid initiatives both on the state level in the United States and elsewhere. 
Part V examines the provisions in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (the “Act”) as they pertain to pharmaceutical importation 
possibilities.  A workable price control mechanism may be the product of state initiatives 
to contain the ever-increasing burden on the under-insured and government dependants 
by exercising their bargaining power as public welfare police.  This price control 
mechanism must include a certification by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to Congress that the importation regulations specified in the Act will “result in a 
significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer,” thus 
allowing prescription drugs priced at lower foreign prices22 to enter the United States 
pharmaceutical market.23  The arguments are being exhausted.  The American people still 
suffer.24
Price controls may be the only way to combat unchecked profit.  If prices and 
profit margins continue to rise unchecked, how much money are Americans willing to 
hemorrhage?  Now may be the last chance. The Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
Congress, and state legislatures must embrace current initiatives and perfect their 
implementation before high prices prohibit patients from meaningful access to 
pharmaceutical technology.
II. RxDepot and Others.
RxDepot is a Tulsa, Oklahoma company, that until November 6, 2003,25 operated 
an online pharmacy through which customers with prescriptions for pharmaceuticals 
could purchase their drugs from a Canadian partner pharmacy.26 RxDepot operated 
eighty-five locations in twenty-six states.27  Upon submission of the relevant prescription 
to the local RxDepot store, customers were asked to fill out various forms concerning 
22
 These lower prices are the product of foreign price control mechanisms not implemented in the United
States.  See infra, Part II. 
23
 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2004).
24
 Act of 2003, supra note 6.
25 See RxDepot, 290 F.  Supp. 2d at 1247.
26
 Brian Barber, Judge Hears RxDepot Case, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 9, 2003, at A1. 
27 Id.
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their medical histories. 28  The customer’s prescription, medical history, and payment 
information were forwarded to the partner pharmacy in Canada, where a Canadian 
medical doctor rewrote the prescription and the order was processed.29
On March 21, 2003 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sent a warning 
letter to RxDepot stating that the FDA believed that RxDepot was illegally re-importing 
manufactured drugs from foreign countries into the United States, as well as importing 
unapproved prescription drugs.30 RxDepot issued a response to the FDA letter, stating 
that the company was merely importing pharmaceuticals that were manufactured within 
the United States.31 Unsatisfied with the response, the FDA continued to send such letters 
to RxDepot warning legal action.32
On September 11, 2003, the United States filed a lawsuit against RxDepot 
alleging violations of the Federal, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)33 and sought an 
injunction as authorized by the FDCA.34 The government presented, and the court 
adopted as fact, evidence of certain undercover FDA investigations which resulted in the 
receipt of: 1) an overfill of a prescription; 2) a generic version of a patent protected drug 
that was neither available nor manufactured in the U.S.; and 3) a non-FDA approved 
warning insert and packaging that failed to mention specific information about the 
possible occurrence of liver damage associated with the use of a particular drug.35
Further, some purchases of re-imports were made from companies other than the U.S. 
manufacturer of the drug.36  Additionally, the government presented evidence indicating 
that the Canadian pharmacy failed to validate the authenticity of certain ordered 
prescriptions.37  However, the effectiveness and potency of the drugs were never tested, 
and no defect in the composition of the drugs themselves was ever alleged.38
28 RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1247.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32
 The FDA has also threatened other companies similar to RxDepot, such as CanaRx Services, Inc. of 
Detroit, MI through this same letter campaign, citing risks to the public health. Id. See FDA Warns, supra
note 19. 
33 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d)(t), 381(d)(1)(2003).
34
 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37
 Barber, supra note 26.
38 RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1243.
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In its rebuttal of the results of the FDA investigations that the court adopted as 
fact, RxDepot argued three facts. 39 First, RxDepot argued that the allegedly overfilled 
prescriptions allowed for a refill amount in excess of the dose actually delivered.40
Second, RxDepot argued that the generic version of the patent protected drug allegedly 
not manufactured in the U.S., was actually manufactured in Puerto Rico at an FDA 
approved facility.41 Third, RxDepot argued that the alleged omitted liver information was 
included in a section of the packaging devoted to potential side effects, and thus not 
entirely absent.42
In finding importing drugs harmful to the consumer, the Northern District of 
Oklahoma stated that the quality of imported and re-imported drugs is “less predictable 
than drugs obtained in the United States” because the integrity of the drugs themselves 
may be compromised during their tenure outside the U.S.43 Furthermore, the district court 
found that drugs imported in greater amounts than the prescription called for could be 
taken for longer periods of time and without the clinical supervision intended by the 
prescribing physician.44  Finally, the court found that the failure to include specific FDA 
approved packaging endangered the patient.45
After finding that prescription drug costs were significantly higher in the United 
States than in other countries, and recognizing Congress as the “best” place to address the 
issues of price control on prescription drugs, the district court addressed the 
government’s petition to grant a preliminary injunction against RxDepot.46   The court 
held that RxDepot’s operations constituted a per se violation of the FDCA.47  Therefore, 
because RxDepot was in violation of the statute, the court held that the government was 
substantially likely to prevail against RxDepot in a full adjudication of the factual issues 
39
 Barber, supra note 26.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d, at 1240.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1242.  When the injunction is authorized as part of a statutory scheme, the court must only find that 
there is a minimal chance of continued violation. Here, the court held that the absence of the injunction 
would allow the defendant to continue re-importing drugs. Id.
47 Id.  at 1244.
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in the case.48  The court stated that RxDepot’s ability to offer lower prices, and whatever 
public health benefits were incidental from these lower prices, were best weighed against 
the benefits of the FDCA restriction in Congress and not through judicial opinion.49
Additionally, because RxDepot’s actions constituted a per se violation of a congressional 
act, injunction could only be avoided if the statute itself was unconstitutional.50
During its examination of the FDCA’s constitutionality, the court held that the 
FDA’s selective prosecution of importers of small quantities of prescription drugs was 
not selective enforcement barred by the constitution because RxDepot was a commercial 
entity operating to provide large quantities of drugs to a significant portion of the 
population.51 Moreover, the court stated that because agencies such as the FDA are given 
great discretion in the prosecution of violations, selective prosecutions are only 
unconstitutional when they are based on arbitrary criteria.52  Since the FDA is limited in 
resources, the court reasoned that selective enforcement against large-scale enterprises 
was a logical application of the FDA’s efforts to reduce the risk of harm to the consumer 
arising from unauthorized re-importation of pharmaceuticals.53  The court dismissed 
other constitutional challenges by finding that no entity can assert certain constitutional 
objections that arise from invalid, illegal activities.54  Therefore, the court granted a 
preliminary injunction against RxDepot for the reasons stated above.55
On November 12, 2003 the Northern District of Oklahoma rejected an emergency 
plea to stay the preliminary injunction while the decision was on appeal.56  In upholding 
its grant of the preliminary injunction, the court held that lost profits from engaging in an 
illegal activity could not constitute the irreparable harm necessary to circumvent 
preliminary injunction.57  Additionally, the court reiterated that the government had a 
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1245.
52 Id.
53 Id. 
54 Id.  Specifically, a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the First Amendment right of 
free speech.  Id.
55 Id. at 1247.
56
 United States v. RxDepot, No. 03-CV-0616-EA, 2003 WL 23120030, at*1 (N.D. Okla. November 12, 
2003).
57 Id.
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prevailing safety concern in preventing re-importation, which overrode any potential 
damage due to the high prices of pharmaceuticals in the United States.58
On November 21, 2003, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to overturn 
the injunction.59 In its appellee brief, the FDA argued that “RxDepot is facilitating 
violations of the [FDCA] on a massive and highly organized scale…unlike the activities 
of individual consumers….”60 On November 23, 2003, frustrated RxDepot attorney Fred 
Stoops re-highlighted the ramifications that closing RxDepot storefronts nationwide 
would have on the elderly in a letter to the Tulsa World, a newspaper in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma: 
The FDA admitted that Health Canada has the same or similar standard to 
its own and is just as safe.  All prescriptions filed through RxDepot came 
from a Health Canada pharmacy. . . .For a second time, the greatest 
generation is being asked to sacrifice -- but this time not to stop the 
onslaught of evil against freedom.  This time it is just about money.61
Similarly, the plight of RxDepot repeats on other fronts.  The FDA threatened 
legal action that may lead to the closure of CanaRx Services, Inc. of Detroit, Michigan.62
In addition to providing cost savings to individuals, CanaRx provides employees of 
Springfield, Massachusetts access to reduced prescription drug prices; the first 
municipality in the United States to provide such benefits to its employees.63  The FDA 
has sent several warning letters to the company.64  The success of the government in 
RxDepot65 and the enactment of the Medicare Act of 2003 indicate that this genus of 
pharmaceutical importer soon will no longer be able to operate in order to provide cost 
savings to the public.
58 Id. 
59 See Robert Boczkiewicz & Brian Barber, Ruling to Keep RxDepot Closed, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 22, 
2003, at A15.
60 See Robert Bocziewicz, FDA Counters RxDepot’s Request For Stay, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 21, 2003, at 
A21.
61 The Truth of the Matter, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 23, 2003, at G2.
62 See FDA Warns, supra note 20.
63 Prescription Drug Importation; Canadian Drug Supplier Says Products Safe, MED. LETTER ON CDC & 
FDA 35, Oct. 19, 2003.
64 Id.
65 RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
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III. The Maine Rx Program, the State Initiative, and Others.
In 2000, the state legislature of Maine enacted the Maine Rx Plus Program.66  The 
program aims to establish affordable prescription drug access to the residents of Maine 
who fall within the state’s Medicaid criteria.67 Additionally, the program provides relief 
to those Maine residents who incur either, un-reimbursed expenses for prescription drugs 
equal to or greater than 5% of family income or, un-reimbursed medical expenses equal 
to or in excess of 15% of family income.68
Under the statute, all manufacturers or labelers of pharmaceuticals that sell their 
drugs within the state under publicly funded pharmaceutical drug plans must negotiate 
rebates with the state.69  The proceeds from the rebates are then placed into a fund, which 
reimburses the participating pharmacies that sell the drugs at a reduced price.70  When the 
act takes full effect on October 1, 2004, pharmacies within the state will sell the drugs at 
the prices reached through rebate negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies, minus 
any further discounts that the rebate fund is able to provide.71  The Maine Board of 
Pharmacy must publish the discounted rates in participating pharmacies, indicating the 
amount of money saved by the initiative.72
Also, the statute provides that the state shall publish the names of the 
manufacturers and labelers who refuse to participate in the rebate arrangement to both the 
public and health care providers within the state.73  In addition, physicians who desire to 
prescribe drugs manufactured by companies who refuse to enter into a rebate agreement 
are subject to prior authorization.74  The prior authroization process requires the 
prescribing physician to verify the medical necessity of prescribing the drug of a non-
66
 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681 (2003).
67 Id. at §2681(2)(F).
68 Id.
69 Id. at §2681(3)(4).  These rebates must at least be equal to the 15% rebates negotiated by the federal 
government under federal law.  Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2681(4).
70
 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681(3)(4) (2003).
71 Id. at §2681(5).
72 Id. at §2681(6)(A).
73 Id. at §2681(7).
74 Id.
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participating entity with a state appointed physician, who may then approve prescription 
of the drug.75
Drug company executives have expressed concerns with regard to prior 
authorization programs. 76 The concern is that the programs decrease the number of 
prescriptions written for drugs produced by those manufacturers who choose not to 
participate in the MaineRx program, thus directly affecting profits of those companies.77
Drug companies also fear decreased profit margins, as lower prices are negotiated 
through rebate agreements, as well as a decrease in physician and patient loyalty.78
In PhRMA v. Concannon,79 the Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) brought suit against Maine’s Commissioner of Human Services and 
the Attorney General of Maine alleging preemption under the federal Medicaid program, 
a violation of the Supremacy Clause, and violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.80
The PhRMA contended that the program imposed a significant burden on Medicaid 
recipients by requiring recipients to go through the hassle of prior authorization without 
providing any valid Medicaid purpose, and that the statute regulated out of state 
commerce.81 The district court upheld both of these contentions and issued a preliminary 
injunction against Maine, holding that the state statute conflicted with the purpose of the 
federal Medicaid statute, and finding that the Maine Rx Program regulated the revenues 
of out of state distributors and manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs.82
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of 
injunction.83  The circuit court held that because the federal Medicaid statute explicitly 
granted states the authority to use prior authorization, no conflict existed between the 
Maine and federal statute.84  The court iterated so long as the requirements under the 
federal statute were met, the purpose of the state, to provide access to medical services 
75 Id; see also Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Medicaid and the Unconstitutional Dimensions of Prior 
Authorization, 101 MICH. L. REV. 602 (2002) (outlining and critiquing the prior authorization process). 
76 Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1864.
77 Id.
78 Id. 
79
 249 F3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001).
80 Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1860.
81 Id.
82
 Woodward, supra note 7, at 180.
83
 PhRMA v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001).
84 Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1865.
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for those who could not afford them, was congruous with the purpose of the federal 
statute.85  Further, the circuit court pointed out that the state might decrease long-term 
Medicaid expenditures arising from untreated conditions by providing prescription drug 
access to individuals that would not otherwise be able to afford the drugs for the 
treatment of deteriorating conditions.86  However, the circuit court recognized that prior 
authorization may potentially affect the quality of medical care provided to Medicaid 
beneficiaries, thus, the court allowed the PhRMA to reserve the right to challenge 
preemption after the implementation of the Maine statute, in the event that prior 
authorization negatively affected medical care.87
The First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the statute did not violate the 
dormant commerce clause.88  In so doing, the circuit court stated that, although the profit 
margins of pharmaceutical companies and distributors could experience incidental 
effects, the statute did not aim to regulate profits itself; nor did the statute regulate the 
prices in other states. 89  Rather, the circuit court stated that the statute only negotiated 
rebates for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Maine.90  Moreover, the court found 
that all transactions policed under the Maine statute occurred within the state of Maine.91
After balancing the local benefits against any burdens on interstate commerce, the circuit 
court held that the benefit derived from increased access to pharmaceutical drugs 
outweighed the loss of profits suffered by the producers of these drugs.92
The United States Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari and affirmed the First 
Circuit Court of Appeal.93 The Court affirmed in a plurality decision.94  In its amicus 
brief, the government argued that the prior authorization allowed under the federal 
Medicaid statute was intended only to balance access with price, not to lower prescription 
85 Id.
86 Id; see also Concannon,  249 F.3d at 81.
87 Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1866.
88 Id. 
89 Concannon, 249 F.3d at 82.
90 Id..
91 Id. These transactions included the purchase of the prescription drugs, the negotiation of the rebate, the 
prior authorization, and the release of the names of nonparticipating manufacturers. Id.
92 Id. at 84.
93 Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1855.
94 Id.
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drug costs for the benefit of all of the citizens of Maine.95  Likewise, since a state must 
submit their proposal for change or amendment of its Medicaid scheme to the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services for approval,96 the government argued that the Maine 
statute was either preempted by federal law or invalid due to of the state’s failure to 
follow administrative procedures.97
However, in their amicus brief, thirty-eight sovereign states and Puerto Rico 
petitioned the Court as one to uphold the court of appeal’s  preemption analysis. 98 The 
brief argued that granting Medicaid recipients cheaper access to prescription drugs 
relieves long term medical costs to the Medicaid system that arise when patients allow 
ailments to go untreated simply because those patients cannot afford the pharmaceutical 
remedy.99 The brief also encouraged the Court to uphold the negative commerce clause 
analysis because the statute did not control prices asked by manufacturers of 
pharmaceuticals in their dealings with drug distributors, the statute only regulates the 
drugs when they enter the state.100  Likewise, the brief stated that Maine did not regulate 
the drugs to benefit state manufacturers or distributors at the expense of out of state 
interests.101  Further, the brief urged that no pharmaceutical manufacturer or distributor 
was handicapped in their dealings with other states or entities therein.102
In its opinion, the Court limited its analysis to the lifting of the injunction and 
declined to resolve any factual disputes.103 The Court also noted that the Maine Rx Plus 
Program may still be invalidated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services should 
the Secretary decide that the program is in fact an amendment to the state of Maine’s 
Medicaid scheme, and thus subject to the Secretary’s review.104  The Court stated that 
although the Maine program did not limit benefits to Medicaid recipients only, the Maine 
program did not necessarily diminish the benefits that the statute provided to the 
95
 Brief of Amici Curiae United States, et.al. at 9, PhRMA v. Concannon, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003)(No 01-
188). 
96 Id. at 10.
97 Id.
98
 Brief of Amici Curiae State of Massachusetts, et.al. at 22, PhRMA v. Concannon, 123 S.Ct. 1855 
(2003)(No. 01-188).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 22-24.
101 Id. at 22-29.
102 Id. at 27-29.
103 Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1855.
104 Id. at 1866.
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Medicaid population.105  The Court also found that the Maine statute benefited the 
Medicaid population by reducing the overall costs of the program through increased 
access to the pharmaceuticals during early treatment of conditions, and that prior 
authorization substantially reduces the costs associated with the implementation of a 
Medicaid program.106
Additionally, the Court held that Maine’s interest in promoting the health of its 
uninsured citizens was a valid justification for implementing its prior authorization 
requirement.  The Court did not require that Maine’s motivation to change Medicaid 
benefits relate to the Medicaid Act itself,107 rather, the state must show only that the 
Medicaid patients’ medical needs are not adversely affected.108  The Court found that 
absent evidence to the contrary; Maine’s prior authorization measures did not negatively 
affect the Medicaid patients’ medical needs. 109  Thus, federal law did not preempt the 
Maine statute.110  Moreover, the Court found that any impact on the profit margins of the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers was merely incidental to the cost savings enjoyed by the 
state in serving the medical needs of its underinsured population.111
In addressing the dormant Commerce Clause attack, the Court upheld the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion stating that the Maine statute did not regulate the price 
of pharmaceuticals negotiated in the transaction between the manufacturer and the 
wholesaler; nor did the Maine program control out of state prices through any in state 
pricing scheme.112  Likewise, the Court found that the Maine statute created no disparate 
burdens.113  Out-of-state manufacturers would not be able to avoid rebates by 
manufacturing within the state, nor would they benefit from in state reimbursement of 
local pharmacies;114 therefore, the Court held that the Maine Rx Plus Program did not 
105 Id. at 1867.
106 Id. at 1867-68.
107 Id. at 1867.
108 Id. at 1870.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1871.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.115  Thus, the Court held that the preliminary 
injunction was improperly granted by the district court.116
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer urged the district court to refer the 
questions that arose about the effects of the implementation of the Maine Rx Plus 
Program to the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction, which allows a court to advantage a government agency’s special expertise 
in a given area.117 Likewise, Justices Scalia and Thomas, in separate concurring opinions, 
stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services must address the issues presented 
in the case.118 Additionally, Justice Thomas also questioned the standing of the PhRMA 
to challenge Spending Clause legislation when the PhRMA did not have a private right of 
action.119
However, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, joined also by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, dissented, stating that a state may not generate revenues using prior 
authorization mechanisms provided by the federal Medicaid Act and apply these 
revenues to purposes “wholly unrelated to its Medicaid program.”120  The dissent feared 
misappropriation of such funds to conduct tasks having no relation to Medicare, such as 
highway and school construction.121  The dissent also questioned whether any Medicaid 
related benefits are actually produced by the Maine program.122  Likewise, the dissenters 
questioned whether increased access to pharmaceuticals or prior authorization actually 
produces costs savings to the Medicaid program in its entirety.123
IV. The Best of the Rest.
Many other states have similar statutes providing for state sponsored prior 
authorization and drug rebate programs to benefit their own state Medicaid programs.124
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1871.
117 Id. at 1873.
118 Id at 1874.
119 Id. at 1878.
120 Id. at 1879.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1880.
123 Id.  The Justices feared a rush to judgment absent any evidence before the Court. Id.
124
 Holt, supra note 12, at 340-43 .
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Michigan’s statute negotiates rebates with pharmaceutical companies by breaking the 
prescription drugs into therapeutic categories and using these categories as reference 
prices, resulting in equitable post rebate prices.125 Like Maine, the Wisconsin statute 
provides that the state Medicaid office is to negotiate rebates with manufacturers and 
publish lists of manufacturers who refuse to participate to the public.126
In 2001, Florida enacted a statute127requiring pharmaceutical drug manufacturers 
to discount the prices of pharmaceuticals by implementing mandatory10% rebates if the 
company desired to place a certain drug on a list of preferred drugs; otherwise, the 
manufacturers are a prior authorization process.128  The PhRMA brought an action 
against Florida’s Secretary of Medicaid Agency for Health Care Administration in 
PhRMA v. Meadows129 alleging that the preferred drug list constituted a “formulary,” as 
defined by the federal Medicaid Act;130 and thus, was preempted by federal law.131  In 
affirming the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the state, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state’s efforts to reduce Medicaid 
expenditures, by providing pecuniary incentives for manufacturers to offer rebates, was a 
valid exercise of their prior authorization power as authorized by the federal statue.132
Further, the circuit court held that the preferred drug list was not a “formulary” as defined 
by the federal statute because the Florida list was not exclusive.133 Any non-preferred 
drugs could be prescribed if it was determined, through a prior authorization procedure, 
that the drug was medically necessary to treat a given malady.134
Unlike the Maine statute, the Florida statute provides that the proceeds from the 
rebates be siphoned into other Medicaid programs promoting public health, instead of re-
circulating funds into local pharmacies.135  The circuit court followed the first circuit’s 
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See Fla. Stat. §§ 409.91195, 409.912 (2001).
128 Id.
129 See PhRMA v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, at 1205 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. den’d by 123 S.Ct. 2213 (2003).
130 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4) (2003).
131 See Meadows 304 F.3d at 1205.
132 Id. at 1208-09.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1209.
135 Id.  Maine’s statute allows funds for drugs that are used for Medicaid patients to indirectly benefit 
under-insured citizens who are not covered by Medicaid criteria, even if marginally.  See 22 M.R.S.A. §
2681(2)(F) (2003).  
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decision in PhRMA v. Concannon136 by recognizing that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services may invalidate the Florida statute if the Secretary determines that 
Florida’s statute sufficiently amends Florida’s Medicaid scheme.137  Moreover, the 
United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari to review Meadows just eight 
days after deciding the constitutionality of the Maine statute.138  Thus, PhRMA v. 
Walsh139 states the controlling principles governing state statutes instituting the 
negotiation of rebates and prior authorization procedures.
Throughout the world, other governments successfully negotiate reduced prices 
with the pharmaceutical industry.  In the United Kingdom, the Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS) negotiates maximum profit margins with all pharmaceutical 
companies that sell their products in the country.140  In addition to controlling research 
and development budgets, the British system negotiates limits on advertising.141  The 
DHSS also establishes a list of drugs for which the government will not reimburse the 
institutions within their wholly funded government health care system.142  Additionally, 
the DHSS provides a budget plan for doctors within the system that rewards a physician 
with surplus funds when that doctor efficiently and effectively prescribes available 
alternative generic drugs.143
In France and Germany, the government also reimburses all state owned facilities 
for covered pharmaceutical drugs by implementing a single buyer system.144 In France, a 
government program determines which drugs are covered and the amount that the 
government will reimburse.145  However, the French government does not hold patients 
or doctors responsible for the quantity or value of the medicines prescribed.146  Unlike 
France, the German government decides for which drugs the participating health care 
136PhRMA v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 72 (2001). 
137 Meadows, 304 F.3d at 1207.
138 PhRMA v. Walsh, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 1871 (2003). See also Fla. Stat. §§ 409.91195, 409.912 (2001).
139 Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1855.
140
 Holt, supra note 12, at 335.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 333.  The government levies taxes to pay for the health care system, which includes purchasing 
pharmaceuticals from their manufacturers, and rations the proceeds accordingly. Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 345.
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organizations will not be reimbursed.147 Although it does not set prices for the drugs, the 
German government establishes a reference price by therapeutic category, in addition to 
establishing a maximum price that the government will reimburse for a certain drug.148
The government audits physicians to ascertain an individual physician’s ability to find 
medically equivalent generics, in addition to the physician’s overall efficiency.149
German citizens must also pay the difference between the reference price and the actual 
price they pay for their prescription.150
The Canadian model institutes a Patented Medicine Prices Review Board 
(PMPRB) that regulates the level of exclusivity a patent enjoys on the prescription drug 
market.151  The PMPRB grants producers of generic drugs the opportunity to reach the 
market before the patent of a certain drug expires by requiring generic manufacturers to 
pay a type of royalty to the company that owns the patent.152  The PMPRB also 
determines the fair return on a given investment that the pharmaceutical company makes 
and sets prices accordingly, thus, necessarily limiting marketing and advertising 
budgets.153  The PMPRB also wields significant bargaining power in its negotiations with 
pharmaceutical companies. 154 This bargaining power arises from the PMPRB’s ability to 
invalidate patents of pharmaceutical companies that refuse to negotiate with the 
government.155
V. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Modernization and Improvement Act 
of 2003.
On December 8, 2003, the 108th Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003 (the “Act”).156  The Act established a tax 
147 Id. at 334-35.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 335.
150 Id. at 334.
151
 Moore, supra note 9, at 160.
152 Id. The PMPRB program operates fairly analogous to the mechanism set forth in the Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, November 14, 2001 W.T.O. No. 01-5860; which permits developing 
nations to allow generic manufacturers to develop and produce generic forms of currently patented 
pharmaceuticals found to be necessary to effect public health crises in those nations. Id.
153 Id. at  163.
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156
 Act of 2003, supra note 6.
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deduction for individuals who invest in savings accounts to provide for any future 
inadequacy or unavailability of health insurance, instituted a discount prescription drug 
program for Medicare recipients, and constructed barbed wire hoops for importers and re-
importers of pharmaceutical drugs to jump through if they desire to import 
pharmaceuticals from Canada.157  Congress also asked the American people to engage in 
a public debate to consider: 1) what health care services coverage they desire; 2) the 
extent of health coverage they desire; and 3) by what means they are willing to pay for 
coverage.158
The prescription drug program will be available as an additional policy to Medicare 
beneficiaries, or as a supplement to existing private health plans for Medicare-aged 
individuals.159  However, until the Act goes into full effect in 2006, prescription drug 
cards can be purchased from participating manufacturers and authorized agencies to 
access discounted prices on brand name and pharmaceutical drugs.160  The cards will also 
provide small allowances to very low-income seniors.161
Under the Act, individuals covered under Medicare, who spend more than $810 per 
year on prescription drugs, benefit from minor discounts.162  Individuals paying between 
$2,250 and $5,100 per year on prescriptions drugs may save up to $1,080 under the 
sticker price.163  Although they enjoy the greatest cost advantage, those whose yearly 
prescription drug dole costs more than $5,100 must pay at least $4,020 a year to take 
advantage of any cost savings.164  Also, seniors who do not join the drug benefit program 
between November 15, 2005 and May 15, 2006, but still wish to join the program, must 
pay a penalty fee of a 1% increase of their annual premium for every month they delay 
157 Id.
158
 42 U.S.C.A. §299 Note (2003).
159
 Sarah Lueck, Senate Clears Bill Expanding Medicare Coverage: Elderly Will Get Discounts on 
Prescription Drugs; Private Sector Role Widens, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2003, at A3.
160
 Tara Parker Pope, New Medicare Drug-Discount Card May Just Add to Seniors’ Frustration, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 16, 2003, at D1.  This article also notes that seniors can get greater benefits on certain drugs by 
purchasing them online, or illegally from Canada. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. However, the article states that these savings may be less than the current price of Canadian 
pharmaceuticals.  Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.  According to the article, this group of individuals includes close to 20% of all Medicare recipients. 
Id.
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joining.165 The penalty fee attaches to all yearly premiums throughout the life of the 
Medicare beneficiary.166
The Act’s governance of the importation of drugs from Canada arguably has the 
greatest impact on the cost of available pharmaceuticals.167  The Act subjects pharmacists 
and wholesalers to a number of safeguards that must be met before the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services may choose whether or not to certify a company to import 
pharmaceuticals from Canada.168  The Act authorizes the Secretary to certify companies 
to import pharmaceuticals from Canada only, thereby implying that otherwise qualified 
pharmaceuticals from other countries would still remain a violation of the FDCA.169
In order to be considered by the Secretary for authorization to import 
pharmaceuticals from Canada, a company seeking to import pharmaceuticals must 
ultimately subject its plight to the complete discretion of the Secretary.170  The company 
must provide information to the Secretary with regard to the quantity, quality, and batch 
history of the drug.171  Similarly, the information provided to the Secretary must include 
similar documentation from the foreign seller of the pharmaceutical drug.172  In the case 
of re-importation, the foreign company exporting the drug back into the United States 
must re-verify the quality173 and quantity of a drug, as well as include scientific 
documentation to that effect.174
The importer or manufacturer must comply with all labeling and branding 
requirements under the FDCA.175  The importer or manufacturer importing the drugs 
must also include all laboratory test records and other documentation verifying the 
identity and quality of the pharmaceuticals.176  Moreover, if the importer is the entity 
conducting the laboratory tests, the importer must acquire FDCA compliant labels from 
165 Id.
166 Id.
167
 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2003).
168 Id.
169 See, e.g., Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307, 308 (1810) (describing the principle of implied 
exclusion in Congressional acts).
170
 21 U.S.C. § 384(c) (2003).
171 Id. at § 384(d).
172 Id.
173 Id. Such quality assurance includes chemical tests done to verify authenticity and an assessment of 
chemical degradation. Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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the manufacturer after verifying the quality of the drug.177  Further, all foreign entities 
that wish to act as middlemen in the importation process described under the Act must 
register with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.178  If any impropriety is 
discovered at any time, the Secretary may immediately suspend importation operation 
until the Secretary determines that the process is once again safe for the public.179
However, in direct contradiction of its intent to protect the public from the 
potential harms of imported drugs,180 Congress granted the Secretary the authority to 
selectively enforce violations of the FDCA by granting specific waivers to individuals 
importing pharmaceuticals.181  The Act provides that the Secretary must focus on 
prosecution of cases in which the drugs being imported pose a “significant threat to 
public health.”182  The Act commands the Secretary to overlook situations in which 
importation is clearly for personal use, and where the imported drug does not “appear to 
present an unreasonable risk to the individual.”183
Individuals who are granted an express waiver to violate the Act, and who wish to 
import pharmaceuticals, must: 1) verify that their purchase is for personal use for no 
more than 90 days; 2) have a valid prescription; 3) import the drug from a seller 
registered with the Secretary; and 4) verify that the drug was manufactured in compliance 
with the FDCA.184  At its own discretion, the Secretary may subject the waiver process to 
any and all other safeguards, in excess of those expressly mandated by the Act, if the 
Secretary feels such waivers are necessary to ensure the public safety.185  Last, the 
Secretary can decide not to implement the waiver program at all, or do so only 
selectively.186
VI. The Cautionary Tale and A Response.
177 Id. at § 384(e).
178 Id. at § 384(f).
179 Id. at § 384(g).
180 Id. at § 384(c)(1).
181 Id. at § 384(j).
182 Id at § 384(j)(1)(A).
183 Id. at § 384(j)(1)(B)(ii).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186
 21 U.S.C.A. § 394(l) (2003).  The opinion of the Secretary is not subjected to any proprietary review.  
Id.
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Generally, the pharmaceutical industry opposes any form of price controls based 
largely on the valid arguments asserted by other free market industries.187
Pharmaceutical companies believe that they should be free to make as much money as the 
market will bear.188  However, the pharmaceutical industry is not subject to the same 
level of market restraint as that of other free market industry.189  Oftentimes no viable 
alternative products exist for individuals suffering from a variety of maladies, thus, those 
individuals are unable to seek equivalent treatment elsewhere.190  Further, insurance 
companies and government agencies that are able to negotiate lower prices with the 
pharmaceutical industry do so without the ability to walk away from the table because of 
this lack of viable treatment alternatives.191
Moreover, because illnesses affect all strata of social hierarchy, demand is consistent 
in all sectors.192 However, the ability to pay is not static.193  These commodities are often 
necessary to sustain life and cannot be foregone by those who cannot afford them without 
jeopardizing one’s own health and well-being.194  Therefore, the pharmaceutical 
companies exist in a vacuum devoid of typical market restraints.
In addition, pharmaceutical companies warn that controls on prices will decrease the 
monetary incentive for research and development.195 Likewise, drug companies fear that 
price control will decrease the amount of money actually available for research and 
development.196  However, as the pharmaceutical industry enjoys increasingly larger 
profit margins, the companies have not correspondingly increased research and 
development investments.197  Rather, the federal government provides the pharmaceutical 
industry with a substantial amount of the research and development funds used by 
pharmaceutical companies in developing new drugs.198  The pharmaceutical industry has 
also increased advertising spending to unprecedented levels, while research and 
187
 Moore, supra note 9, at 149.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 155.
191 Id.
192
 Holt, supra note 12, at 327.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195
 Moore, supra note 9, at 155.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 156.
198 Id. at 156-57. 
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development spending remains relatively stagnant.199  Additionally, drug companies fix 
prices based on self-interested factors.200
Because the pharmaceutical industry has decided to promote individual drugs as a 
marketing strategy, instead of increasing spending on research and development to bring 
a greater variety of drugs to the market, a minimal level of price control would force the 
drug companies to increase development volume in order to increase profits.  Some level 
of price control forces a mutually beneficial relationship between the pharmaceutical 
industry’s need to prosper financially, and society’s need to prosper physically.  Last, 
price control mechanisms introduce certain barriers of market restraint that are currently 
absent from the pharmaceutical market in the United States.
So what to do now? The Medicare Act of 2003 and the plight of companies like 
RxDepot have constrained the ability of private industry to participate in accessing lower 
prices on prescription drugs in other markets.201  Canada is the only foreign market from 
which companies could possibly obtain express authorization from the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to import pharmaceuticals under the Act if they are seeking 
to import drugs legally.202  However, the Canadian government fears its own citizens will 
experience a shortage of pharmaceuticals if importers buy pharmaceuticals for export.203
In a corresponding act of chivalry, several drug companies are attempting to curtail the 
amount of drugs exported to Canada so that Americans cannot access lower prices.204
Perhaps a workable price control method involves the Maine model.205  Like the 
several other states that have adopted similar statutes,206 Maine exercised its bargaining 
power as an entity to provide for the pharmaceutical needs of the state’s Medicaid 
population.  Additionally, Maine also provides for the needs of its under-insured non-
Medicaid population as well.  By incorporating the Maine type of broad coverage with 
certain price referencing mechanisms, such as those instituted in the United Kingdom and 
199
 Woodward, supra note 7, at 175-177.
200 Id.
201 See Act of 2003, supra note 3; United States v. RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1239 (N.D. Okla. 
2003).
202
 Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307,308 (1810).
203 Canada Worried about Shortages Due to U.S. Reimportation, WASH. DRUG LETTER, Nov. 3, 2003. 
204
 Matthews, supra note 16, at B1.
205See 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681 (2003). 
206 See PhRMA v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Michigan that break pharmaceuticals down into therapeutic categories, state legislatures 
could increase their bargaining power to negotiate lower prices on pharmaceuticals to 
meet the needs of their state’s population.  
If states can effectively negotiate lower prices, the pharmaceutical industry will be 
forced to negotiate lower prices with the private insurance sector as well.  As these 
negotiated prescription drug prices decrease the cost to the consumer, and approach the 
Canadian prices, the danger to the public arising from importation and re- importation will 
likewise decrease due to the decreased consumer incentive to access foreign markets.  
The pharmaceutical industry will be forced to divert monies from advertising and 
marketing in order to generate a greater number of products and offset the “losses” 
suffered from decreasing profit margins.  As the pharmaceutical companies rush to 
develop a greater variety of products, the flurry of development will allow the 
pharmaceutical industry to maintain its wealthy status among the nation’s health care 
industries and will benefit the American people as new cures and treatments become 
available.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Maine statute, the 
Court also indicated that the final decision would rest with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services.207  This indication, in addition to Congress’ express and exclusive 
authorization to the Secretary to certify companies to import drugs from Canada,208
indicates that the Secretary serves as the ultimate arbiter of pharmaceutical prices in the 
United States.  Although the Secretary has historically refused to approve such 
importation,209 the sole responsibility for the fate of pharmaceutical prices in the United 
States nevertheless lies with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Therefore, the 
opportunity to achieve the correlated benefit of an increased variety of cures and 
treatments lies with the Secretary as well as pharmaceutical companies would scramble to 
maintain profit levels through research and development, instead of single product 
advertising.
The Secretary must find and recommend that the new state Medicaid initiatives are 
valid amendments to individual states’ Medicaid programs. Likewise, the Secretary must 
207See PhRMA v. Walsh, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 1866 (2003). 
208 See 21 U.S.C. § 384(c) (2003).
209 Boston to Force Issue on Canadian Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2003.
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authorize private industry companies that are in compliance with the terms of the 
Medicare Act of 2003 to begin re-importation of pharmaceuticals from Canada.  By 
exposing the United States pharmaceutical market to entities that have the bargaining 
power to negotiate fair prices for their customers or constituents, the prescription drug 
industry will finally be subjected to a form of market constraint that is vital to a healthy 
free market.210
The FDA and Congress’ aggressive regulation of pharmacists and wholesalers who 
import pharmaceuticals211 (hereafter “pharmaceutical importers” or “importers”)  in the 
name of public safety is misplaced.  In fact, the statute that purports to regulate the 
importation of pharmaceutical drugs alters the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA)212 and grants the Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to 
implement an importation program only if such a program would “pose no additional risk 
to the public’s health and safety”.213  The statute also extends to the executive branch the 
ability to waive enforcement of the law on individuals who import pharmaceuticals solely 
for personal use.214  The effect of the statute clearly indicates that the only safeguarding 
the statute will do is to refortify the dam that prevents the pharmaceutical industry’s 
profit margin from spilling into the valley of market restraint, where others attempting to 
provide quality drugs at quality prices lie in wait.
Through the Act, Congress mandates the Secretary to weigh the burdens and benefits 
of implementing pharmaceutical cost reducing procedures.215  The benefits of 
pharmaceutical price reduction have traditionally been discussed in terms of increasing 
access to individual consumers.216  However, providing basic access to individuals cannot 
be considered a benefit if the resulting access cripples individuals’ ability to afford their 
daily bread,217 let alone the ability to access the other pecuniary privileges and liberties 
that being a citizen of the United States entails.  Therefore, the Secretary must 
acknowledge the preceding utility analysis to open the United States pharmaceutical 
210
 Holt, supra note 12, at 327.
211
 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2004).
212
 21 U.S.C. § 381 (2004). 
213
 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2004). 
214 Id. 
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 21 U.S.C.A. § 384(l)(2)(B)(IV)(bb)(iii)(II) (2003).
216 See 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681 (2000).
217 See Barber, supra note 1, at A1.
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market to the world; thereby providing citizens meaningful access to the prescription 
drugs that fuel American prosperity and ingenuity. 
VII. Conclusion.
The citizens of the United States are suffering at the hands of the pharmaceutical 
industry’s profiteering machinery.218  Congress acknowledges that, despite the overall 
wealth of the United States, all those who desire health care coverage cannot access 
health care coverage.219  Likewise, Congress stated that: “Innovations in health care 
access, coverage, and quality of care, including the use of technology, have often come 
from the States, local communities, and private sector organization, but more creative 
policies could tap this potential.”220
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003221
and the decision in RxDepot222 prevent private industry from obtaining unfettered access 
to the price control mechanisms in foreign countries that could serve as one potential cost 
reduction mechanism.  Similarly, athough the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of state statutes promoting rebate negotiation and prior authorization 
procedures,223 the ultimate decision on both the importation issue and the validity of state 
Medicaid amendments lies with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  All 
conjecture concerning the institution of price control mechanisms in the United States 224
ended with the enactment of the Medicare Act of 2003.  
Now is truly the “last call” for price control measures in the United States, and the 
only “bartender” left to effectively implement such measures is the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, a department of the executive branch.  The legislative and judicial 
218 See Woodward, supra note 7, at 174.
219 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 299 Note (2003).
220 Id.
221 See Act of 2003, supra note 3.
222
 United States v. RxDepot, 290 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1247 (2003).
223 See, e.g., PhRMA v. Walsh, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003).
224 See, e.g., Holt, supra note 12, at 325; Woodward, supra note 7 at 169; Moore, supra note 9, at 149.
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branches have both deferred their questions to the executive branch.225 Therefore, the 
Secretary must exercise both its authority and ability to take the essential steps to subject 
the pharmaceutical industry to the restraints of a true free market.  The only alternative is 
to continue the suffering of individuals who hemorrhage substantial amounts of money to 
the most profitable industry in the United States.226
As attorney Fred Stoops aptly stated: “The only real safety issue in this case is the 
safety of the obscene profits of the pharmaceutical companies.”227
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